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The North Korean nuclear weapons program poses a challenge to stability 
in Northeast Asia.  The United States’ foreign policy with North Korea takes a 
hard-line position, and cannot solve this problem unilaterally and must rely on 
support from the other countries in the region.  Solving this nuclear issue is only 
one piece of the stability challenge in this region. 
North Korea’s nuclear program gained international attention when it 
signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, threatened to withdraw 
in 1993, withdrew in 2003, and stated it has a nuclear weapons capability in 
2005.  The Six-Party Talks were initiated with the goal of stopping and 
dismantling North Korea’s entire nuclear weapons program, and has had limited 
success.  Previous negotiations between North Korea and the United States 
have ended with one party, usually North Korea, failing to uphold its part of the 
agreement.  The Six-Party Talks may be successful, but may take decades.  It 
comes down to the question, is the United States pursuing the best foreign policy 
toward North Korea?   
This thesis examines North Korea’s nuclear program history, how it 
perceives itself and others, reviews the current U.S. policy, recommends a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), is located in Northeast Asia, bordering three countries.  To its north, 
North Korea shares a 1,416km border with China as well as a 19km border with 
Russia.  As it is the northern part of the Korean peninsula, it shares its southern 
238km border with South Korea, also known as the Republic of Korea (ROK).  
North Korea’s west coastline borders Korea Bay and the Yellow Sea, and its east 
coastline borders the East Sea, and has a total coastline of 2,495km. Its 
geographic size in land (120,410 sq km) and water (130 sq km) is slightly smaller 
than the state of Mississippi.  Topography in North Korea is mostly mountainous, 
having roughly 20 percent of the land arable.  Pyongyang is North Korea’s 
capital.1
North Korea was founded in 1948, and since then has been in isolation.  
The state has very few trading partners outside of China and Russia, and does 
not have diplomatic relations with the United States.  Information we, in the 
United States, receive about North Korea largely comes from other countries.  
This limited access to information makes it hard for us to understand the state 
and its actions when it interacts within the international community, as is rarely 
done.2
Is the United States pursuing the best foreign policy toward North Korea?  
This thesis will examine the current U.S. policy and provide reasons why a 
flexible policy would work better than the current hard-line approach.  Solving the 
nuclear issue is only one piece of the stability challenge in Northeast Asia.  The 
key to implementing a flexible foreign policy toward North Korea is the ability for 
the United States to see the policy with a North Korean lens in ways that serve 
U.S. interests. 
 
1 Korea, North, “The World Factbook,” 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed August 13, 2005). 
2 Don Oberdorfer. The Two Koreas (Basic Books, 2001), 7. 
2 
The North Korean nuclear program poses a challenge to stability in 
Northeast Asia.  The United States’ foreign policy with North Korea takes a hard-
line position, which primarily focuses on North Korea’s nuclear program.  This 
thesis will argue that a more flexible foreign policy with North Korea is to be 
preferred. 
This thesis will examine North Korea’s nuclear program history, how it 
perceives itself and others, provide a review of the current U.S. policy, 
recommend a flexible policy, and propose a method of implementing the flexible 
foreign policy. 
In Chapter II, one will understand North Korea’s nuclear program 
capabilities as well as how it may have had its beginning.  Chapter II will also 
provide a short description of the DPRK’s nuclear program, highlighting its joining 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its safeguard agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This chapter will also address both 
the 1994 and 2002 crisis and what actions were taken by the United States to 
overcome these events. 
It is important to understand how the North Korean regime sees itself and 
how it views the situation that it is in.  Chapter III examines the nuclear situation 
through a North Korean lens.  Understanding North Korea’s view and mindset of 
its leader, Kim Jong-il, is important for implementing a successful and influential 
foreign policy.  Future U.S. negotiations and foreign policy will make more sense 
after understanding why North Korea pursued a nuclear weapons capability.  The 
United States leadership must understand the current situation and how the 
North Korean regime views the latest agreement from the Six-Party Talks, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and how these impact on North Korea.  The 
recently researched archives of North Korean allies by the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars sheds light on the North Korean leader’s 
thoughts and allow the United States leadership to predict future actions.  The 
archives reveal how the North Korean regime viewed the need for nuclear  
 
3 
weapons and the NPT.  Insight into North Korean past actions will allow U.S. 
policy makers the ability to craft policy that will influence positive North Korean 
regime behavior.   
The United States has taken a hard-line stance against North Korea, as 
the method for halting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  Chapter IV will 
address the current policy, which asserts that the United States will not officially 
make deals with North Korea until that state takes positive steps toward 
dismantling its nuclear weapons program.  The United States is using the Six-
Party Talks as a means to reach complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement 
(CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program.  Parties to these talks are the United 
States, South Korea, Japan, North Korea, China, and Russia.  In addition to 
foreign policy, the United States implemented a Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) in 2003, which is aimed at limiting North Korea’s illicit transfer of nuclear 
knowledge to other states.  These measures though sufficient to keep up the 
pressure, but are insufficient to induce behavior change. 
The United States has a presence in Northeast Asia, both in South Korea 
and Japan.  Reunification of the peninsula is an ultimate goal for both Koreas, 
however the means to this end are quite different.  This is where the flexible 
foreign policy becomes the preferred way forward.  Chapter V introduces a 
flexible foreign policy that would stabilize the region.  The current policy 
precludes entering into bilateral agreements with North Korea. However, South 
Korea believes this would be a good move on the part of the United States, to 
establish a bilateral agreement with North Korea.  Right now, the United States is 
the only involved country that does not have such an agreement with the DPRK.  
The ability to use both the PSI and NPT, if North Korea reenters into the treaty, 
may work toward stabilizing the region.  The Six-Party Talks may be another 
forum that could stabilize Northeast Asia, if it can serve as a roadmap toward 
normalizing relations between the two Koreas.  In this context, the United States 
needs to reexamine its role in Northeast Asia.  The United States should pursue 
a policy to have regional actors share burdens and take the lead and 
responsibility for the region. 
4 
The final chapter will compare the United States’ current hard-line 
approach and flexible foreign policy options toward North Korea.  This thesis 
prefers a flexible policy approach by the United States.  A nuanced and flexible 
foreign policy will have a greater positive impact in Northeast Asia and also 
provide insightful prospects of halting the North Korean nuclear program.  This 
chapter will also propose an implementation method for the flexible policy.  As 
soon as open dialogue is established, this proposed flexible policy can be 
implemented.  It will progress in a phased manner, and North Korea will receive 
incentives as it successfully completes each phase.  The key to success in this 
endeavor is cooperation and open dialogue for all parties involved.  In this case, 
the initial parties to this strategy will be the Six-Party Talks members, which 
include the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and North Korea.  
Each has a part, as the proposed solution seeks to use these Six-Party Talks as 
a roadmap for reaching the goal of security and stability in Northeast Asia. 
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM HISTORY 
North Korea has an indigenous nuclear weapons program capability.  This 
chapter will describe how this program began, and then trace its nuclear history 
highlighting its joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its 
safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  
Following these events, North Korea entered into a continuing international 
nuclear crisis, after which the Agreed Framework came into play and diverted a 
potential confrontation.  There were limited successes, but this agreement 
ultimately failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapon program.  Events 
continued that eventually led to the official declaration by North Korea: 
possession of a nuclear weapons capability.  These nuclear developments were 
shaped by North Korea’s geographic and historical context. 
A. DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS AND CHINESE 
The North Korean nuclear program had its beginnings as early as the end 
of World War II, with most of the nuclear assistance coming from either the 
former Soviet Union or China.  The Soviets mined uranium from ore in the region 
for its own nuclear weapons program.  Following the Korean War, North Korea 
and the Soviet Union signed agreements of cooperation in nuclear research.  
North Korean scientists went to study at the Soviet Union’s Dubna Nuclear 
Research Center, and the Soviets provided a small research reactor for 
Yongbyon.  This experimental research reactor was under IAEA safeguards, 
because of the agreement between the two states.3
Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has anticipated an invasion 
by the United States.  The Soviets had a vested interest to control North Korea 
as much as it could, because the Soviets did not want to enter into a war with the 
United States.  The Soviets were concerned that North Korean provocations 
against South Korea would escalate and had the potential to start a war that 
 
3 Don Oberdorfer. The Two Koreas (Basic Books, 2001), 251. 
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involved the United States.  North Korea depended on the Soviets for military, 
political, and economic support beginning in 1949.4  
Following China’s nuclear test in 1964, North Korea approached China for 
nuclear research assistance.  China turned down the request, because it did not 
see the utility for the smaller Korean state having a nuclear weapon capability.  
This did not deter North Korea from making the request again in 1974.  China 
again turned down this request.5
Intelligence analysts believe North Korea set out on its own nuclear 
program sometime in the late 1970s.  By this time, the DPRK had a large pool of 
scientists who had studied nuclear science in Moscow and also developed 
nuclear related departments in its universities.  These included a nuclear physics 
division and departments in nuclear electronic engineering, nuclear fuel 
engineering, and nuclear reactor engineering.  Satellite images in 1982 caught 
the signs of possible construction of a nuclear reactor, on which analysts believe 
construction began around 1979.  It is believed that Kim Il-sung provided the 
authorization to begin its nuclear weapons program.  An ore processing plant and 
nuclear fuel fabrication plant were built about the same time.  When the 5-MWe 
reactor became operational in 1986, North Korea had begun construction on the 
first of two more graphite reactors.  Construction of a large radiochemical, which 
was for reprocessing operations laboratory began in 1987.6
B. JOINING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
North Korea acceded to the NPT on December 12, 1985.  When a new 
member enters into this agreement, the new state negotiates its safeguard 
agreements of nuclear material and equipment with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA).  The negotiating period for this step is normally 18 
 
4 Dana Steinberg, “Newly Available Evidence Offers Insights Into North Korea’s Thinking, 
Actions.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 25 April 2005, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=116812 
(accessed May 18, 2005). 
5 Oberdorfer, 252. 
6 Young-sun Ha, “Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea,” 
Asian Survey, (Vol. 18, No. 11, November 1978): 1134-1151. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-
4687%28197811%3A11%3C1134%ANOSSAW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 (accessed  March 4, 2005). 
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months.  North Korea took its time and moved methodically slowly, not approving 
its safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
until seven years later on April 10, 1992.  Once the safeguards had been agreed 
upon, North Korea submitted its declaration of nuclear facilities.  After a state 
submits a statement that declares all its nuclear related facilities, the IAEA sends 
a group of inspectors to each of the sites to make sure the state is complying 
with the agreements and regulations.  For North Korea, the IAEA inspections 
began in May 1992.7
North Korea submitted its nuclear declaration to the IAEA in early May, so 
inspections could begin later the same month.  The report provided details of its 
uranium mining sites, nuclear plants, and other nuclear related facilities.  These 
included two uranium mines and concentration plants, two large nuclear reactors 
under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon, as well as small nuclear reactor 
and critical assembly at Kim Il-sung University.8
By the time North Korea finished safeguard negotiations and the 
inspections began in May, it had conducted more reprocessing than it had 
declared.  North Korea had shut down its reactor in 1989 for about 100 days, 
which was reported in the open press.  Neither the United States nor other 
countries took action when North Korea undertook these actions.  The strategy 
used by the international community was to have North Korea join the NPT and 
then bring them under compliance.9  During the 1992 inspections, however, the 
IAEA discovered evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more plutonium 
than it had disclosed.  North Korea provided the IAEA with a sample that was 
supposed to show the IAEA that North Korea had only performed a single 
reprocessing operation.  The IAEA determined that the sample did not match 
what the North Koreans were saying.  The sample contained different byproducts 
than what you would expect to see if the sample had only been made from 
 
7 “Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards,” In Focus: IAEA and DPRK, March 2005, 
http://www.iaea.org (accessed  March 4, 2005).  
8 Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 83. 
9 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (Washington 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 244. 
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plutonium from a facility that conducted only one reprocessing operation.  This 
fact meant North Korea had produced more plutonium than it had declared to the 
IAEA and to the international community, which sparked the international nuclear 
crisis.10
C. CRISIS AND AGREED FRAMEWORK 
This crisis occurred at a time when both the United States and South 
Korea were in the midst of presidential elections.  The IAEA board of governors 
held a closed-door session in February 1993, at which time sensitive imagery 
was shown as evidence of deceptive practices by the North Koreans to hide its 
nuclear program.  The IAEA was then ready to take the case to the United 
Nations Security Council, if North Korea did not comply.   As the pressure 
mounted from the IAEA, the U.S.-ROK Team Spirit exercise that began on March 
9, 1993 added more tension to the situation.  Team Spirit is a military exercise 
that practices the steps taken to bring troops onto the Korean peninsula in the 
case of war.  Although this exercise was scaled down, it still involved around 
120,000 South Korean and American troops.11   
North Korea viewed this exercise as a potential invasion against North 
Korea to preemptively strike its nuclear program.  Citing the NPT escape clause 
on defending supreme national interests, North Korea announced on March 12, 
1993 that it was withdrawing from the treaty.  Under the treaty protocol, the 
withdraw of a state party does not take effect until after a three-month waiting 
period, which set a deadline of June 12 for successful negotiations to keep them 
in the treaty.12  
Negotiations began with North Korea soon after its announcement of 
intent to withdrawal from the NPT.  On the very last day, North Korea announced 
it would suspend withdrawal from the treaty, however it saw itself in a different 
category other than being a party to the treaty.  The IAEA was then permitted to 
 
10 Oberdorfer, 270. 
11 Oberdorfer, 276-9. 
12 Steven Aftergood, “Nuclear Weapons Program,” June 9, 2003 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/ (accessed March 4, 2005). 
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conduct limited inspections, although the IAEA’s goal was to verify that North 
Korea was in full compliance.  The IAEA inspectors were limited to inspecting 
only the sites declared by North Korea to the IAEA.13
During May 1994, North Korea discharged fuel from its 5-MWe nuclear 
reactor.  When this was done, the IAEA was not able to conduct any verification 
tests on the core fuel, which would have provided a more accurate picture of the 
fuel’s history.  The initial inconsistencies had not been addressed, and this action 
by the North Koreans did not help the situation.  The IAEA sent a specialist to 
sample the fuel from the reactor, but when the specialist arrived, he was not able 
to sample the fuel, although he did observe some of the fuel being unloaded.  He 
reported back that it was a mess and nothing could be learned from the manner 
that North Korea had discharged the fuel.  It is believed that North Korea had a 
total of roughly 8,000 spent fuel rods from this reactor, and may have begun 
reprocessing operations, but the IAEA was not able to verify whether or not this 
was the case.  The IAEA Board of Directors then suspended all non-medical 
technical assistance to North Korea. Former President Carter was able to defuse 
the situation with a trip to North Korea later that same month.  These events led 
to the Agreed Framework, an agreement between the United States and North 
Korea.14   
Approximately one month after former President Carter had visited North 
Korea, Kim Il-sung died of a heart attack on July 8, 1994.  Talks were still going 
on in Geneva, because the North Korean party had not been told of his death.  
After learning of his death, the party left Geneva to return to North Korea, 
however it continued with the talks in August.15
This framework was solidified on October 21, 1994.  The United States 
committed in this agreement to supply North Korea with two light water reactors 
(LWR) that had the capacity of generating 2,000-MWe and to provide 500,000 
 
13 Steven Aftergood. 
14 “Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards”; James Foley, “North Korea continues nuclear 
programme,” http://www4.janes.com  (accessed on March 4, 2005). 
15 Oberdorfer, 343. 
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tons of heavy fuel oil annually to fill the energy gap while the reactors were being 
constructed.  A LRW is considered proliferation safe, because the spent fuel rods 
contain a small amount of the plutonium isotope needed for nuclear weapons 
production, which is the opposite condition of fuel rods from North Korea’s 
graphite reactor.  Spent fuel rods from a graphite or heavy water nuclear reactor 
contain rather large amounts of the plutonium isotope desirable for nuclear 
weapons.  In addition to nuclear and economic assistance, the United States and 
North Korea would establish diplomatic relations if this framework progressed in 
a positive way.  The United States would also lift the trade embargo on North 
Korea, initiated during the Korean War.  North Korea committed to freeze and 
ultimately dismantle its graphite reactor and associated facilities by the time 
construction was completed and operation of the LWR began.  This framework 
also led to the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), which would finance and supply the reactors.  Although 
the crisis was not yet over, it was on its way to being resolved.16   
There were many deadlocks and setbacks from the beginning. The 
Agreed Framework aimed to have the first LWR operating by 2003.  As part of 
the agreement, North Korea would be in full compliance with its safeguards 
before any of the key nuclear components would be delivered.  Due to numerous 
reasons, the start of construction was delayed and did not begin until February 
2000.  Concrete was poured August 7, 2002, which meant the first nuclear 
components would have been scheduled for delivery in mid-2005.  Since this 
program met with several more delays, the operational date for the first reactor 
has slipped from 2003 to 2007; the date for delivery of these nuclear components 
has not been made.  Some nuclear experts believe this new target date will be 
much later than 2007 if it gets back on track and runs through to completion.17
The IAEA began to take steps to begin inspections to bring North Korea 
into full compliance.  During talks in October, North Korea acknowledged having 
 
16 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” CRS Issue Brief for 
Congress, February 25, 2005, http://fpc.state.gov/c4763.htm (accessed March 16, 2005). 
17 Ibid. 
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a clandestine uranium enrichment program for making nuclear weapons.  
Apparently this program was started in the early 1990s with assistance from 
Pakistan.  The IAEA requested information in November 2002 about this program 
from North Korea, but received no response.  KEDO, with input from the United 
States, suspended the December shipment of heavy fuel oil.18   
In late December 2002, North Korea lifted the freeze of its nuclear 
program and restarted operations at its Yongbyon nuclear facilities.  It also 
restarted the 5-MWe reactor.  North Korea cut the seals and disabled IAEA 
surveillance cameras around its nuclear facilities and ordered the IAEA 
inspectors to leave the country.  In January 2003, North Korea announced its 
withdrawal from the NPT to be effective January 11, 2003.  It stated that its 
reason for withdrawal from the treaty was the stoppage of the heavy oil 
shipments and charged that the Bush administration planned to conduct a pre-
emptive nuclear strike on North Korea.  On April 10, 2003, North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT became effective.19
Following these events in January, the Bush administration established a 
three-party forum to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue.  Included in the first 
meeting in April 2003 were the United States, North Korea and China.  Following 
this first meeting, the Bush administration approached South Korea and Japan 
pledging to include them in future meetings.  Four months later, the first Six-Party 
Talks met in China, as Russia was included.  Successive meetings in August 
2003, February 2004, and June 2004 were not able to achieve any significant 
breakthroughs.  Most of the blame is focused on North Korea.20   
D. DECLARATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
In February 2005, North Korea officially announced that it had nuclear 
weapons.  This public announcement came as a shock, in the fact the state 
 
18 Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Helene Marchart, “North Korea: A Chronology 
of Events, October 2002-December 2004,” CRS Report for Congress, January 24, 2005, 
http://fpc.state.gov/c4763.htm (accessed February 8, 2005); “Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear 
Safeguards.”  
19 Manyin, Chanlett-Avery, and Marchart.  
20 Ibid. 
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made it official.  Its current declaration of having a nuclear weapons capability is 
another tool it can use to play off of the other countries in the region.21   
Since the nuclear declaration, North Korea has been playing this new 
bargaining chip quite well.  In the past months, many articles in the news have 
focused on the North Korea nuclear issue, covering broad topics as the latest 
stance on the Six-Party Talks to its dealings with other countries. 22  In April 
2005, news about North Korea’s potential ability to strike the United States 
deflected the focus from Iraq back onto North Korea.  This item caught lots of 
attention, because it involved a highly visible politician, Senator Hillary Clinton, 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency 23 .  A May 2005 trip report by Selig 
Harrison, offers limited insight of North Korea’s thinking process.  North Korea 
feels it is on a more equal footing with the United States and has taken offense to 
the harsh rhetoric by Secretary of State Rice, naming them “an outpost of 
tyranny.”  North Korea feels it cannot enter into the Six-Party Talks while under 
pressure, because it must be able to demonstrate to both its people and military 
that North Korea has the respect of a sovereign nation and of a powerful 
military. 24  Headlines in June 2005 linked North Korea with support to Iran, 
offering more than missile technology.  North Korea is known for its ability to 
build underground facilities, which is the assistance it may be providing Iran.  
North Korea has assisted other countries with tunneling equipment in the past.25
The recent admission by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, admitting that he 
sold enrichment machines, drawings, and technical data to North Korea is hard 
to disprove and still maintain credibility.  When the news first broke in February 
2004, North Korea and Pakistan denied the allegation.  Pakistan investigated and 
 
21 Niksch.  
22 Con Coughlin, “North Korea to Help Iran Dig Secret Missile Bunkers,” London Sunday 
Telegraph, June 12, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ (accessed June 12, 2005). 
23 David S. Cloud and David E. Sanger. “Agency Says North Korea Able to Mount Warheads 
on Missiles,” The New York Time, April 28, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/ (accessed April 28. 
2005).  
24 Selig Harrison, “DPRK Trip Report,” Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special 
Report, May 10, 2005 www.kinu.or.kr (accessed May 12, 2005). 
25 Coughlin, “North Korea to Help Iran Dig Secret Missile Bunkers.”  
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the allegation bore truth, proving North Korea and Khan wrong.  It appears that 
the proof is in the favor of the United States.  North Korea’s nuclear program has 
had a negative impact on its foreign policy.  North Korea has a few things left to 
bargain with.  With all of this mounted against them, it is difficult to believe that 
North Korea still believes it will have victory over the south.  North Korea still 
sees it as being only a matter of time.26
North Korea is skilled in using rhetoric, which has been used successfully 
as a deterrent and as another way to start a dialogue.  Just as Kim Il-sung did 
when he was leading North Korea, his son is following in the same footsteps.  As 
a way to keep what little economic and subsistence it can, North Korea may be 
using the only bargaining chip it has left.  The country now has limited resources 
and attempted economic reforms in 2001.  Since these reforms have not been as 
fruitful as North Korea had hoped, its announcement in 2002 of pursuing the 
ability to enrich uranium may be seen as a return to the earlier brinkmanship 
days.  If this is the case, the United States can expect delays and stalling tactics 
when implementing policy with North Korea.27
Brinkmanship is North Korea’s strongest and best used tool.  Common 
elements of this are used time and again.  These include being opaque with its 
objectives, presenting itself as victims of aggression, and presenting itself as the 
underdog.  These skills aid North Korea in getting what it wants and then stalling 
negotiations.  By joining the NPT, North Korea was able to get nuclear 
technology from the Soviet Union in the form of at least a graphite reactor.  After 
it signed the NPT, it was able to successfully stall IAEA inspectors from 
inspecting its undeclared nuclear sites.  To this day the IAEA does not have an 
accurate accounting of the fuel from the 5-MWe graphite reactor.  Brinkmanship 
was first displayed in 1993 during its first action to withdraw from the NPT.  This 
 
26 David Albright, Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation 
Networks,” The Washington Group Quarterly, (Vol. 28, Issue 2, Spring 2005): 111-128; “Re-
imposition of sanctions feared: US aid may be jeopardized – official,” The DAWN Group of 
Newspapers, 2004, February 5, 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/05/top5.htm (accessed 
March 19, 2005). 
27 Paul French, “Economy Root to N Korea Crisis,” BBC News, April 12, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4437001.stm (accessed June 11, 2005). 
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skill eventually landed them the Agreed Framework, which would revamp its 
nuclear program, however it would lose its bargaining power in the future if this 
were to happen.28   
From the Dear Leader’s perspective, Kim Jong-il probably understands 
that the nuclear program is the most powerful bargaining chip he has left, and he 
seems as skilled in bargaining as his late father, Kim Il-sung.  Kim Jong-il has 
been preparing his country for the time of the United States invasion and now 
sees it may be on the horizon.  The nuclear issue may also be his only way to 
keep the United States from invading.  Due to how the operation in Iraq has 
developed, it is easy to understand that Kim Jong-il believes that it may be a 
matter of time before the United States focuses on North Korea.29
The latest round of Six-Party Talks in August and September 2005 provide 
the latest illustration how North Korea plays its nuclear bargaining chip.  Initially 
stalling, slowly coming to the table, stalling again, and then finally coming to an 
agreement, North Korea seemed to be serious in resolving the nuclear crisis 
once and for all.  At the end of the Six-Party Talks on 19 September, North Korea 
agreed to dismantle its nuclear program, return to the NPT, and to allow 
monitoring by the IAEA.  The other five countries agreed to provide a security 
guarantee, energy, promote trade, promote economic exchanges, and discuss 
providing LWRs at the appropriate time.30  
By the next day, the situation was back to normal.  In this case, normal 
means anything other than what you would expect.  North Korea announced the 




28 James R. Lilly, “The “Great Game” on the Korean Peninsula,” Working Papers in the Asia 
Pacific Research Center. October 1997, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/lij01/index.html (accessed 
March 14, 2005). 
29 “Q&A: North Korea’s Nuclear Threat,” BBC News, May 6, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2340405.stm (accessed June 11, 2005). 
30 “ROK’s Yonhap Chronology of Developments in DPRK’s Nuclear Issue, Six-Party Talks,” 
September 19, 2005, http://www.yonhapnews.net/Engservices/3000000000.html (accessed 22 
September 22, 2005). 
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provide the LWR first.  The next round of Six-Party Talks was scheduled for 
November 2005, where this item was to be discussed at length, if it were not 
negotiated and settled beforehand.31   
From November 2005 through the May 2006, no new rounds of Six-Party 
Talks were scheduled.  The issue keeping North Korea away from the 
negotiations is the United States’ handling of North Korea’s alleged financial 
misconduct.  The United States accused North Korea of counterfeiting U.S. 
currency and applied financial sanctions on a Macao-based bank.  The United 
States views this as a separate incident from the nuclear issue.  North Korea 
blames the United States for not having negotiations and views this as a threat to 
its regime.32   
The United States worked with China, attempting to get North Korea to 
return to the Six-Party Talks, and North Korea has rejected the offer.  North 
Korea’s position remains that it will not return to these talks until the United 
States lifts the financial sanctions.33
Meaningful dialogue and negotiations with North Korea will be greatly 
enhanced when we understand how North Korean leaders think and are able to 
perceive events through a North Korean lens in ways that better serve U.S. 
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III. NORTH KOREAN PERCEPTIONS 
The nuclear threat from North Korea is the lynch pin of regional security in 
Northeast Asia.  One of the ways to combat the nuclear threat has been the 
initiation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by the United States.  This 
chapter will attempt to view the PSI through the DPRK’s eyes and propose an 
option that would resolve the current crisis.  By examining its past activities, 
current activities, and its possible perception of the PSI, this chapter shall attempt 
to describe a course North Korea might take, which could lead to regional 
security. 
The ultimate goal for North Korea’s deceased Great Leader, Kim Il-sung, 
was the unification of the two Koreas.  His son, Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, who 
took over following the Great Leader’s passing in 1994, continues with the same 
goals. The Great Leader Kim Il-sung believed it to be his right to unify Korea 
through any means necessary, especially by force.  In order to get close to the 
DPRK mindset, one must attempt to view events through a DPRK lens.  This 
chapter shall review the past to see how it may change our view of the future, 
look at events following the Korean war, such as a failed assassination attempt 
and the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968; the ax murders in 1976; how the 
DPRK established and views its nuclear program, and then provide a succinct 
review of its current activities to draw out trends.  The content assesses its recent 
nuclear declaration and the standing of the Six-Party Talks, and then delves into 
how the DPRK may perceive the PSI.  Lastly, options that North Korea may have 
will be identified, and the option that would favor its goal will be spelled out. 
A. REUNIFICATION 
Since the end of the Korean War, leaders in Pyongyang believe the United 
States will invade the DPRK.  Following the Korean War, the Soviets had a 
vested interest to control the DPRK as much as it could.  The Soviets, ruled by 
Stalin, did not want to enter into a war with the United States, and North Korea 
depended on the Soviets for military, political, and economic support beginning in 
1949.  In order to regulate North Korea, the Soviets developed a two-part 
18 
                                           
formula, the Stalin formula.  The first part was clear, which said the DPRK would 
not make an independent decision to attack the Republic of Korea (ROK).  
Before the DPRK could attack South Korea, it would need to get an approval 
from Moscow and have the consent of its allies.  The second part of the formula 
stated that if the ROK or the United States attacked the DPRK, North Korea 
would be allowed to defend itself.  This second part of the formula turned out to 
be a loophole that the Dear Leader, Kim Il-sung, would exploit by disguising its 
attacks on the ROK in the hopes the ROK would strike back.34
The DPRK formulated a plan to assassinate the ROK President, Park 
Chung Hee in January 1968.  North Korea also captured a U.S. Navy vessel later 
in the same month in an attempt to deflect attention from the failed assassination 
attempt.  Another bold attempt by the DPRK to invoke a military response from 
the ROK occurred in 1976, an event which came to be known as the Panmunjom 
Ax Murders.35  Later in the 1970s to early 1980s, the DPRK started down the 
nuclear path.36   
North Korea attempted to assassinate the ROK President in 1968.  The 
goal of this action was to provoke either a revolution or start a military coup, and 
then the DPRK would be waiting for the new ROK government to ask for military 
assistance, which would then lead to the unification of the peninsula.  A group of 
commandos conducted a raid on the Blue House, the equivalent of the U.S. 
White House, in January 1968.  The endeavor failed, and the DPRK did not 
inform the Soviets of this before or immediately after.  In the minds of the DPRK, 
this was not an invasion but an assassination attempt.37
The fallout from this event was greater than North Korea ever expected.  
In order to cover up its failed assassination attempt, within the same month the 
 
34 Dana Steinberg, “Newly Available Evidence Offers Insights Into North Korea’s Thinking, 
Actions.” Posted April 25, 2005, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=116812 
(accessed May 18, 2005). 
35 Kathryn Weathersby, “The Enigma of the North Korean Regime: Back to the Future?” Ilmin 
International Relations Review 10, 1 (Spring 2005):13. 
36 Young-sun Ha, 1136. 
37 Weathersby, 13. 
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DPRK captured a U.S. Navy vessel, the USS Pueblo, off its eastern coast.  
Neither the Soviets nor any of the DPRK’s allies were informed ahead of time of 
the USS Pueblo’s capture.  This action put the Soviets in an awkward position, 
as the Soviets had to support North Korea.  As this situation calmed down, the 
Soviets reiterated its stance within the second part of the Stalin formula that its 
agreement was purely defensive in nature.  The Soviet leadership expressed its 
interest in supporting North Korea if it the attack was unprovoked.38  
This did not stop the DPRK from requesting military or economic aid.  The 
Soviets visited the DPRK five months after the USS Pueblo event, sending 
Deputy Head of the Council of Ministers, V. N. Novikov, to Pyongyang.  Kim Il-
sung attempted to use this visit to his advantage.  He presented his case for 
increased military support, hoping his argument would make the point.  He 
argued that the ROK received advanced military equipment from the United 
States as a result of the USS Pueblo event.  The Soviets pointed out that North 
Korea bore the responsibility, because the attempted assassination prior to the 
attack on the navy ship also contributed to the United States providing this 
military assistance.39  
Another bold attempt by the DPRK to provoke a military response from the 
ROK occurred in 1976, an event which came to be known as the Panmunjom Ax 
murders. The DPRK explained the incident in the DMZ as being staged by the 
United States.  North Korea made the case to an East German military 
delegation, emphasizing the difficulty of deciding if such actions were deliberate 
United States provocations or just an accident.  Kim Il-sung provided an 
explanation as a deliberate provocation, in order to make the presidential election 
more favorable for President Ford.  He stood by the fact that the United States 
struck first.  He further explained that the United States did this routinely, stating 
that President Johnson staged the USS Pueblo incident, President Nixon 
 
38 Weathersby, 14-17. 
39 Weathersby, 23. 
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organized the spy plane incident in 1969, and now President Ford was trying to 
stir up the world with this little tree incident.40
B. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The nuclear issue has become the DPRK’s most popular means for 
getting international attention.  The reasons why North Korea pursued its quest 
for nuclear weapons remains unclear.  North Korea was motivated by both a 
sense of regime survival and possibly prestige.  The acquisition of nuclear 
weapons requires a certain level of scientific expertise, and North Korea had this 
expertise.41
North Korea acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 
12, 1985.  The usual time for a new member to finish negotiating the safeguards 
is 18 months.  North Korea did not approve its safeguard agreement with the 
IAEA until seven years later on April 10, 1992.  Once the safeguards had been 
agreed upon, North Korea submitted its declaration of nuclear facilities and the 
IAEA inspections began in May 1992.   It would be brought out later that North 
Korea had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility, which would be capable 
making a uranium-based nuclear weapon.42
During one of the 1992 inspections, the IAEA discovered evidence that 
revealed the DPRK had reprocessed more plutonium than it had disclosed.  This 
led to further inspections.  The DPRK refused to comply with a special IAEA 
inspection, which led to tensions.  Former President Carter was able to calm the 
situation, as Kim Il-sung agreed to freeze his nuclear program.  This action led to 
the 1994 Agreed Framework, where North Korea would freeze its nuclear activity 
and have the IAEA conduct inspections verifying the freeze.  The IAEA 
inspections began again and were again denied access.   
In October 2002, North Korea stated in unofficial terms that it had the 
ability to enrich uranium.  It was later learned that the enrichment technology had 
come from Pakistan.  This started the second crisis, where the heavy fuel oil 
 
40 Weathersby, 24-5. 
41 Young-sun Ha, 1139. 
42 “Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards.” 
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shipments were halted.  North Korea then restarted its nuclear program, kicked 
out all the IAEA inspectors, and then announced its withdrawal from the NPT 
effective January 2003.  North Korea cited the halted shipping of heavy fuel oil in 
December 2002 and said that the Bush administration was planning a pre-
emptive nuclear strike, as its justification for its treaty withdrawal.  This led to the 
Bush administration initiating Six-Party Talks.43   
Even with these recent events, the Six-Party Talks give the DPRK the 
potential to enter into the real world, provided it was prepared to change its 
behavior of proliferating material.  The next round of talks, when they meet, will 
be successful, only if the DPRK wants them to be successful.  The arrangement, 
involving all of North Korea’s neighbors at once, prevents them from playing one 
party against the other.  One factor that may impact the talks is the PSI.  The 
maritime exercises hosted by Singapore44 and Japan45 might have signaled to 
North Korea that it must change its ways.  If North Korea does not change its 
behavior, its existence as a country may be threatened.   
We know the DPRK has taken part, at least as a recipient, in the illegal 
transfer of nuclear technology.  This fact was discovered during the time Libya 
was dismantling its nuclear program.  Libya acknowledged that it was acquiring 
the nuclear technology through Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan.  The President of 
Pakistan denied this allegation, however Pakistan did conduct an investigation.  
Pakistan found that not only had Khan supplied Libya with nuclear material, but 






43 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program. CRS Issue Brief for Congress. 
May 6, 2005. 
44 “Singapore Hosts PSI Exercise ’Deep Sabre,’” August 17, 2005. http://www.nti.org 
(accessed August 17, 2005). 
45 “Japanese Regional Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise 
(Team Samurai ’04),” http://www.state.gov (accessed March 17, 2005). 
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then later he admitted to selling nuclear related items to these countries.  During 
a national apology broadcast to the Pakistani people, he said that he did this 
alone without government involvement.46   
Pakistan was one of the DPRK’s trading partners when it came to WMD 
technology.  It is believed that A.Q. Khan made numerous visits to North Korea, 
during one of which he was allegedly shown three nuclear devices.  This 
information became public two months after Khan admitted to selling North Korea 
nuclear technology and equipment for uranium enrichment.47  The DPRK has not 
officially admitted to conducting uranium enrichment operations, other than the 
one statement in 2002. 
C. PSI PERCEPTIONS 
As part of an effort to stop global shipments of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials, President 
George Bush announced a new initiative at the end of May 2003, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an action resulting from the December 2002 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.  This national 
strategy recognized the need for a more robust tool to stop the proliferation of 
WMD, and PSI is the more robust tool that fits within the existing international 
framework of treaties and agreements.48  PSI is aimed at interdicting WMD 
shipments before they reach their destination.  PSI is not an organization, but 
rather a voluntary activity that receives neither special nor specific funding.  To 





46 Larry A. Niksch; Spencer Abraham, ”The Eisenhower Institute Presents: Secretary 
Spencer Abraham Department of Energy,” 
http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/presscenter/release64-04.htm (accessed May 25, 2006). 
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Program,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Asian Export Control Observer, (Issue 1, April 
2004): 19-21.  
48 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” U.S. State Department. 
December 2002, http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200212/WMDStrategy.pdf (accessed 
March 17, 2005).  
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means, law enforcement, and other available tools in order to prevent the WMD 
related technology or materials shipment from getting to the country or state of 
concern49.   
The PSI began with eleven countries and has now grown to seventeen.  In 
the beginning, these countries met, developed, and published the PSI Statement 
of Interdiction Principles.  These principles, agreed to in Paris September 4, 
2003, provide the parameters for when a PSI member state can/should interdict 
a suspect ship, airplane, or vehicle.  The principles state that a PSI member 
shall: 
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with 
other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their 
delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-
state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities 
that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to 
interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation 
through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers 
(either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery 
systems, or related materials. 
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant 
information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting 
the confidential character of classified information provided by other 
states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and 
efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize 
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts. 
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal 
authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and 
work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and 
frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments. 
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding 
cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the 
extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with 
their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include: 
 
49 “The Proliferation Security Initiative,” U.S. Department of State, International Information 
Programs, USINFO Publications. June 2004, http://www.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/ 
(accessed November 21, 2004). 
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a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to 
or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not 
to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so. 
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown 
by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel 
flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas 
beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably 
suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-
state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that 
are identified. 
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate 
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels 
by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in 
such vessels that may be identified by such states. 
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their 
internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when 
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to 
enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, 
internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be 
subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to 
entry. 
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown 
by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably 
suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state 
actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace 
to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are 
identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying 
such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of 
such flights. 
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as 
transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states 
or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, 
aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are 
identified.50
 
50 “Proliferation Security Initiative, Statement of Interdiction Principles,” NPT Briefing Book, p. 
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PSI is operationally active, and numerous countries have shown some 
level of interest in supporting this new activity.  The focus is to develop the 
interdiction principles through exercises, which include maritime, air, and ground 
interdiction.  Four exercises were conducted in 2003: an air tabletop exercise and 
two maritime exercises in the Mediterranean, and one maritime exercise in the 
Western Pacific.  Exercises completed during 2004 included one war-game, two 
ground, two air, and four sea exercises that took place in the United States, 
Europe, the Caribbean, the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the 
Mediterranean.  The draft plan for 2005 and beyond calls for six exercises and 
one war-game per year.51   The latest PSI exercise completed in 2006 ended 
April 6, which was an Australian hosted three-day air interdiction / Command 
Post Exercise (CPX).  Only the week prior a two-day maritime interdiction / CPX 
was hosted by the Netherlands.52
Croatia is the fourth country to have signed ship-boarding agreements 
with the United States under the PSI, the other three being Liberia, Panama, and 
the Marshall Islands.  These countries have given permission for the United 
States to board and inspect one of their flagged vessels, if it is suspected of 
carrying cargo that is destined for a WMD program.  This is a success story, 
because Liberia has the world’s second largest number of vessels under its flag, 
second only to Panama.  These two states roughly account for approximately 
one third of all worldwide shipping.53  This greatly increases the number of ships 
that may be tracked if a country uses a ship under one of these flags. 
The PSI is not limited to interdiction, but also committed to cooperation in 
preventing individuals, companies, or rogue nations from becoming WMD 
facilitators. North Korea has been a U.S. foreign policy challenge, since it 
decided to restart its nuclear installations at Yongbyon and to withdraw from the 
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http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/wjtsc05_psi.ppt (accessed February 17, 2005). 
52 “Calendar of Events,” May 2006, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12684.htm (accessed May 2, 
2006).” 
53 Richard Boucher, “The United States and the Republic of Croatia Proliferation Security 
Initiative Shipboarding Agreement,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/47039.htm (accessed 
June 14, 2005)  
26 
                                           
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  The Bush administration has four main 
objectives for its strategy to have North Korea dismantle its nuclear program.  
The strategy has been to terminate the Agreed Framework; withhold any United 
States reciprocal measures until North Korea has taken steps to dismantle its 
nuclear program and make other military concessions; apply diplomatic and 
economic pressure by an international coalition; and through PSI, plan for future 
sanctions and interdiction of North Korean maritime and air shipping.  One of the 
goals of PSI is to cut off or impede North Korea’s exports of WMD-related 
technology and materials to other countries, so as to constrict its income from 
these sales.  Export of WMD and illegal drugs make up a large source of income, 
which maintain the political elite and military in North Korea.54
PSI becomes an important addition to the existing treaties already in 
place.  Again, PSI is not an organization, like the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) or Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), nor does it replace the NPT or 
any nuclear free zone treaty that is already in force.  The PSI is conducted by 
states that have the common interest of stopping the spread of WMD technology 
and materials.  The United States felt so strongly about this idea that it submitted 
a resolution to the United Nations Security Council.  Resolution 1540, which 
addressed the heart of the PSI interdiction principles, was passed in April 2004.  
It encourages all of the member states to enforce disarmament treaties to which 
it is a signatory and establish effective domestic controls to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery means.55
The North Korean United Nations Permanent Representative submitted a 
letter to both the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council 
requesting immediate action be taken against the PSI exercise in Japan, 25-27 
October 2004.  North Korea perceived the exercise as a potential pre-emptive 
strike against them, and further stated that PSI was an illegal leverage into the 
internal affairs of independent UN member states.  The DPRK stated that 
 
54 Larry A. Niksch, 4. 
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participation in this exercise by those states involved with the Six-Party Talks 
would create an obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue on the 
Korean peninsula56
Concern still exists that PSI will not work, because all states must 
participate for it to be effective in stopping the flow of WMD related technology 
and material.  While this is true on the surface, there is a silver lining.  If some 
states do not participate, then that non-action by itself limits the area of the 
proliferation.  As the majority of states pledge support and join, that action may 
be felt in future negotiations.  Some impact can be seen in the Six-Party Talks 
that are attempting to resolve the nuclear challenge on the Korean peninsula.  
PSI has already made its way into the talks, through Japan’s and Singapore’s 
hosting of PSI exercises.  This has drawn attention to the serious nature of 
stopping the spread of WMD material.  North Korea is isolating itself through its 
own decisions.57
The language used in the PSI is similar to language found in the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, not specifically naming or labeling a state as a 
proliferation concern.  This allows states the option of handling other states in an 
ambiguous fashion, not having to be as bold as the United States that has a list 
of such states of concern.58 The Wassenaar Arrangement, established in 1996, 
contributes to regional and international security and stability, by promoting 
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and 
dual-use goods and technologies.  Through national policies, participating states 
seek to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development 
or enhancement of military capabilities, and are not diverted to support such 
capabilities.  This Wassenaar Arrangement began in 1995 with discussions 
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leading to an agreement among the 33 founding members, to begin a new type 
of multilateral cooperation to control nuclear weapon-related dual use equipment 
and technology.59
The PSI is seen as illegal by the DPRK.  It is perceived as leverage into 
the affairs of United Nations member states, and aimed at stopping North Korean 
trade with other countries.  North Korea perceives this as a way the United 
States is attempting to cause regime change.  Preparations for exercises that 
support PSI are seen in the same light as other major exercises, as a preparation 
and practice for invasion.  The DPRK accuses the United States of being 
oppressive and argues that PSI is a violation of international law, which always 
draws attention from the international community.  North Korea only hints at this, 
because it does not have exemplary standing itself in international law.  The 
more leverage North Korea can get from this by showing it is oppressive, the 
more it diminishes the United States’ influence with PSI.60
Understanding its past and present activities along with its view of PSI, 
there are four policy options that the DPRK may take, which shall be explained 
below.  The most likely policy North Korea may pursue would be in the state’s 
best interest.  It is important to keep in mind that the policy option may not be the 
best choice for stabilizing the region, because regime survival seems to be the 
most important.  This is illustrated by the fact that the international community 
believed the regime would collapse soon after the death of its Great Leader, Kim 
Il-sung.  We are now eleven years past that mark and the DPRK is still in the mix, 
so to speak.   
The common thread between the United States and the states in 
Northeast Asia is the nuclear threat.  This thread is wearing thin, because of the 
different approaches each of these countries wishes to pursue.  The most 
important country to understand is the DPRK.  Once you understand why it is 
doing what it is doing, the task of figuring out a palatable resolution becomes 
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much easier.  Currently the United States is the only state taking the hard-line 
approach, which will not achieve the goal of containing or changing the behavior 
of the DPRK.  The objectives in this endeavor, realizing a denuclearized 
peninsula and dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program, can only be achieved 
when all involved move ahead as one. 
Having all PSI participants act as one has been, and will continue to be, 
the most difficult part.  Developing a plan, agreement, or treaty will take time, but 
will be successful in the end unless conflict were to erupt.  Within the U.S. 
administration, there are disagreements on the best way to handle this nuclear 
issue.  This was best illustrated in a non-official war game simulation in 
Washington D.C., exercised by the Atlantic Monthly.  After reviewing the past 
situation, the group of participants was not able to agree on a solution to stop the 
DPRK’s nuclear program.  Recommended solutions ranged from conducting a 
strike against the nuclear facilities, to containment, to engagement.  The lessons 
learned from this simulation are worth noting here.  The first is that the situation 
will probably not get any better over time.  The second lesson is that the United 
States may be hurting itself by having only multilateral talks instead of agreeing 
to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea.  The last lesson is that the biggest 
danger the United States faces is the transfer of nuclear material to a terrorist or 
terrorist group.61  North Korea has four options, which are in the best interests of 
the DPRK and may or may not lead to regional stability.  In option one, North 
Korea uses PSI as leverage and gains a better position for itself as it is going into 
the Six-Party Talks.  In this option, the DPRK would argue that PSI is 
discriminatory and is aimed at disrupting its shipping, thus impacting its trade and 
commerce. 
Option two would be that the DPRK is able to establish bilateral 
agreements with the United States, establish a small base of talks that lead to 
economic and trade relations, and then move to major points such as unification 
of Korea or dismantling the nuclear program.  In this option, North Korea may be 
 
61 Scott Stossel, “North Korea: The War Game,” The Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 296 Issue 1. 
(July/August 2005): 107-108. 
30 
                                           
able to undermine U.S. authority by gaining the support of South Korea.  This 
may be achieved by North Korea as it describes Team Spirit or an equivalent 
ROK-U.S. joint exercise as being treacherous activity by the United States, which 
negatively impacts its trade.  This is illustrated by the DPRK mobilizing the work 
force to reinforce the military, thwarting a U.S. invasion that will begin following 
one of the major exercises.   
Option three describes the DPRK starting a nuclear arms race.  This could 
be remotely possible if North Korea were to conduct a nuclear test.  Tensions in 
the region may increase if it were to outsource a test to a third country, such as 
Iran.  Iran would be the only candidate that could have an interest in conducting a 
nuclear test for North Korea.  North Korea supplied missile technology to Iran 
during the 1980s and 1990s.62  If a nuclear test in this situation were to occur 
with a nuclear warhead that Iran could mate to one of its missiles, it would benefit 
both and North Korea would not need to conduct its own nuclear test. 
The fourth option would have the DPRK accede to the demands put on its 
nuclear program and enter the world order.  The DPRK comes clean and enters 
into negotiations.  This would potentially lead to economic aid packages, 
normalized relations and security guarantees from the United States, North 
Korea being removed from the terrorist list and no longer labeled part of the “axis 
of evil.”  Most of these benefits are similar to those in the earlier 1994 Agreed 
Framework.  Had the 1994 Agreed Framework continued successfully to its end, 
the DPRK would have benefited by receiving light water nuclear reactors, heavy 
fuel oil until the reactors came on-line, normalized relations with the United 
States, lifting of trade restrictions, and a nuclear security guarantee.63
When comparing these policies with one another, the third policy is the 
least likely scenario, as long as Iran remains a member of the NPT.  As stated 
earlier, all of the states in the region believe it would be a bad situation for the 
DPRK to have a verifiable nuclear capability.  It is not in the best interest of North 
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Korea to start an arms race.  By doing so, it would quickly alienate the states that 
are providing it support, by sending the wrong signals.  In this sense, the DPRK 
would be hard pressed to make an argument that it was the victim or was being 
victimized by the other state’s practices of stopping the arms race.  This would be 
especially true if it was to conduct a nuclear test. 
Both the first and second policy options seem plausible, but neither is in 
the best interest of the DPRK.  The first policy would suit the DPRK in the 
beginning, but would lead to more of the same.  The DPRK would not be able to 
get any traction and not be able to gain any influence.  In this case North Korea 
could probably survive, however it likely would continue to limp along just barely 
surviving.  The second policy option is a bit better than the first, but it also is not 
in the DPRK’s best interest.  Its past will come out to haunt them if it follows this 
option.  As North Korea plays the victim when describing the injustice done to it, 
similar to the Soviet reaction when its Great Leader asked for more aid in 1968, 
the international community will remember that the DPRK probably bears some 
responsibility that caused that situation.   
The first three policies all focus on the nuclear issue as the main issue.  
Human rights begin to play a part in this as agreements are made.  It is in the 
best interest of the DPRK to keep out agencies that would report on its alleged 
human rights abuses, from its perspective.  If the DPRK enters into one of these 
first three policies, it could lead to opening its doors faster than it would be able 
to control.  This might lead to a much larger migration of refugees into both China 
and/or the ROK.   
One of the most important things to remember is North Korea wishes to 
enter into agreements under its own terms.  This would be quite a difficult feat to 
accomplish if economic and other assistance packages were good only if North 
Korea was able to meet human right standards.  This may be one reason for 




                                           
D. GOALS 
For the reasons stated above when comparing the policies with one 
another, it is most likely the DPRK would follow the fourth option.  The DPRK has 
come or will soon come to the realization that it cannot survive forever in its 
current state.  In a similar way, the Great Leader came to the realization the two 
Koreas could not be united by force, because he would not be able to overcome 
the powerful destruction from the threatened use of nuclear weapons.  In a 
similar fashion, the Dear Leader may not have a regime at all if he maintains the 
status quo.  In order to be a leader, one must have people to lead.  The Dear 
Leader Kim Jong-il would be sentencing himself and his people to a terrible end if 
he is not able to come to the table as seen through the eyes of his military and 
public, a sovereign state entering into negotiations on its own terms. 
Taking all of this into account, one issue stands out.  The DPRK has been 
doing the same thing all these years, because this approach has worked for 
them.  U.S. policy toward North Korea is similar to the hard-line policy the United 
States had with the Soviets.  It worked well with the Soviets during the Cold War, 
but the DPRK is not the Soviet Union and this is no longer the Cold War.  
Another point brought out at the end of the war game simulation, was the 
response from one of the participants, Robert Gallucci, to the fact the United 
States would not negotiate with the DPRK because it had cheated in the past.  
Gallucci’s response was that the Soviets cheated on most of the deals, however 
we were better off at least having a deal.  He made a similar response to people 
who say negotiating with the DPRK is rewarding bad behavior.  His response 
was that he was not out to teach people lessons, but more interested in the 
national security of the United States.  The main question comes to this: Are you 
better off with this deal or without it?  The point being, one is better off with a deal 
than without one.64
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IV. CURRENT U.S. POLICY 
North Korea poses a challenge to both Northeast Asia and the United 
States interests, because of its nuclear capability.  This chapter examines the 
current U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea.  The United States has taken a 
hard-line stance against North Korea, as the method for halting North Korea’s 
nuclear program, and will not officially deal with North Korea until that state 
makes positive steps toward dismantling its nuclear weapons program. North 
Korea must adopt measures that lead to the complete, verifiable, irreversible 
dismantlement (CVID) of its entire nuclear program.  The United States will use 
the Six-Party Talks (United States, South Korea, Japan, North Korea, China, and 
Russia) as the negotiation strategy to reach CVID.  This chapter begins by 
presenting background information explaining how the nuclear situation led to the 
Six-Party Talks.  Then this chapter will address the current status of the talks, 
and then end with a discussion addressing the potential outcome and impacts on 
the participants. Both the positive and negative points in pursuing the current 
U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea will be discussed. 
It is believed that North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons for quite a 
long time.  The Clinton administration attempted to solve the problem of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program with the 1994 Agreed Framework.  This 
strategy seemed to work until the discovery of North Korea’s uranium enrichment 
program during the George W. Bush administration in 2002.  When the Bush 
administration replaced the Clinton administration, the strategy changed from 
continuing bilateral talks to a much harder line position, as seen when North 
Korea was labeled as being part of the “axis of evil” in the 2002 State of the 
Union address.65
North Korea has a history of supporting terrorism against the United 
States.  The U.S. foreign policy has maintained a hard-line position, for the most 
part, from the Reagan administration through the current Bush administration. 
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Former President Reagan addressed the growing threat of terrorism to the 
United States and labeled the North Korean government as actively supporting 
an international terrorist campaign against the United States and U.S. allies.  
President Reagan cited the numerous border incidents involving U.S. military 
personnel getting killed and the failed assassination attempt on South Korean 
President Chun in Burma as examples.66
During the Reagan administration, maintaining troops in both Japan and 
South Korea were in the best interest of the United States.  These troops 
maintained a credible deterrence against aggression in Northeast Asia.  The goal 
was to keep markets open, which was in the U.S. and allies’ interest as well as 
preserving the free trade system in that region.67
Former President George H. W. Bush continued the hard-line position.  
His administration maintained the same position of maintaining troops in 
Northeast Asia.  He stated he would not reduce the number of troops stationed in 
South Korea, and the military presence will remain in South Korea as long as the 
South Korean government requests the U.S. presence and as long as it is in the 
interest of peace for the troops to remain there.68
During a news conference with South Korean President, Roh Tae Woo, 
President George H. W. Bush clearly stated the U.S. policy toward North Korea 
would not shift from its hard-line position.  The United States government would 
pursue contact with North Korea, but not without consulting South Korea.  The 
United States would not start a dialogue with North Korea, just because North 
Korea makes such a request.  By doing so, it would send the wrong signal to 
both South and North Korea.  South Korea may believe the United States is 
conducting policy in the United States’ own interest, and North Korea could view 
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this as a weakness to exploit between the United States and South Korea.  The 
George H. W. Bush administration believed it was important for the two Koreas to 
have direct dialogue, and the United States would work with North Korea through 
its South Korean ally.69
Former President Clinton continued the hard-line position from the 
previous administration, however, his administration changed to more of an 
appeasement approach during the 1994 nuclear crisis.  The policy in place at the 
beginning of the Clinton administration was designed to deter North Korean 
aggression, while simultaneously exploring new methods to reach out to the 
North Korean government to achieve a negotiated settlement to the refusal of 
IAEA nuclear inspections.70
Signing the NPT and the following inspections spread over three U.S. 
administrations.  Before the inspections began at the nuclear facilities, North 
Korea was required to submit a declaration of all its nuclear related facilities.  The 
inspectors would only verify activity at those listed facilities.  This did not give the 
IAEA inspectors free reign for country-wide inspections, however, inspectors 
were given latitude to request inspection of questionable facilities.   
North Korea submitted its nuclear facility declaration, which listed facilities 
that were both operating and under construction.  Those that were in operation 
included two research reactors, a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, a nuclear fuel 
storage facility, a uranium mine, two uranium refineries, and its 5-MWe graphite-
moderated nuclear reactor.  The facilities listed as being under construction 
included a radiochemical laboratory, a 50-MWe nuclear reactor, a 200-MWe 
nuclear reactor, and a 635-MWe nuclear reactor.  As part of its declaration, the 
DPRK reported nuclear related operations.  The DPRK reported that it had 
extracted approximately 90 grams of plutonium from the fuel of its 5-MWe reactor 
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at Yongbyon in 1990. The first inspection team arrived in the DPRK for a five-day 
inspection, 11-16 May 1992.  Following this initial visit, the IAEA and DPRK 
developed an inspection schedule that included six inspections beginning toward 
the end of May and finishing in February 1993. These preliminary inspections 
would set the baseline of North Korea’s nuclear program.  The main focus of 
these preliminary inspections was to ensure that the new NPT member was not 
pursuing a nuclear weapons program.71
Prior to this in 1991, North Korea and South Korea signed the “Agreement 
on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the 
South and the North.”  This agreement had the potential to cease all hostilities on 
the peninsula and provide a path toward reunification.  Its key points included 
recognition of each other’s systems and provide for economic, scientific and 
cultural exchanges between the two.  This also addressed the potential of 
opening dialogue between divided families and reopening roads and rail lines 
severed by the Demilitarized Zone.72
The actions that led up to what came to be called the Agreed Framework 
began as officials investigated inconsistencies from North Korea’s nuclear 
declaration to the IAEA.  The IAEA requested to inspect two sites that were not in 
the declaration, which were thought to be related to waste nuclear storage. The 
IAEA also requested to look at more documentation that would further clear up 
the inconsistency, but North Korea denied both requests from the IAEA.  When 
the North Koreans refused the inspections, it said that it refused these 
inspections on the grounds that the inspections might jeopardize its supreme 
interests.  This language was derived from article X of the NPT,73 and allows a 
member state to withdraw from the treaty.74   
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Negotiations began with North Korea soon after its announcement of its 
intent to withdraw from the NPT.  On the very last day, North Korea announced it 
would suspend its withdrawal from the treaty, however, the North Koreans stated 
that it saw itself in a different category than being a party to the treaty.  The IAEA 
was then permitted to conduct limited inspections.  Although the IAEA’s goal was 
to verify that North Korea was in full compliance, IAEA inspectors were limited to 
their inspection of only the sites declared by North Korea to the IAEA.75
Approximately one month after former President Carter had visited North 
Korea, Kim Il-sung died of a heart attack on July 8, 1994.  Talks were still going 
on in Geneva, because the North Korean party had not been told of his death.  
After learning of his death, the party left Geneva to return to North Korea; it 
continued with the talks in August.76
A. SIX-PARTY TALKS 
Following these events in January 2003, the Bush administration set up a 
three-round party talk to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue.  Included in the 
first meeting in April 2003 were the United States, North Korea and China.  After 
this meeting, the Bush administration approached South Korea and Japan and 
pledged to include them in future meetings.  Four months later, the first Six-Party 
Talks was held in China that included Russia as well.  Successive meetings in 
August 2003, February 2004, and June 2004 were not able to achieve any 
significant breakthroughs.  Most of the blame for lack of progress is focused on 
North Korea.77
There is great concern and eagerness to learn if North Korea has an 
operational nuclear weapon.  It is possible that North Korea has developed and 
manufactured a few nuclear weapons, but there is no consensus about the 
numbers.  Scientists in the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as analysts in 
the Department of Defense (DoD), have based the number of nuclear weapons 
that North Korea possess on the amount of fuel rods that have been 
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reprocessed, estimated to have been 8,000.  The information about enriching 
uranium is more troubling, because there has been no definitive answer provided 
as to when this project started.  Most initial reports by DOE and DoD estimated 
the number of nuclear weapons between one and three.  Currently, those 
estimates have gone as high as six nuclear weapons.  This higher estimate is 
based on the amount of weapons grade plutonium (239Pu) that North Korea could 
possibly reprocess from the spent fuel rods.  Reprocessing is the method of 
extracting 239Pu from spent nuclear fuel rods that have been removed from a 
nuclear reactor.  Analysts are not confident one way or the other about a 
uranium-based weapon.  The uranium enrichment question is based on when 
analysts believe the program started and if North Korea actually has the 
capability for enriching uranium.78
After a long break, the Six-Party Talks resumed in September 2005.  
During this meeting the party members were able to come to an agreement and 
announced a joint statement at its conclusion.  It was a productive meeting, and 
the joint statement contained six points.  The first point reaffirmed that the party 
members agreed that the goal of these talks would lead to the denuclearization 
of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful way.  Within this point, North Korea 
announced that it had a right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
would fully quit its nuclear program, and would return to both the NPT and IAEA 
safeguards in the near future.  The United States announced that it had no 
nuclear weapons on the peninsula and that it had no intention of attacking North 
Korea with either nuclear or conventional weapons.  The ROK stated that it did 
not have nuclear weapons within its territory, that it would not accept them in the 
future, and that the 1992 joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula should be observed.  The other party members stated their respect for 
this goal and agreed to discuss supplying North Korea with light-water reactors at 
the appropriate time.  
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In the second point, all party members agreed to recognize each state, 
using international norms and relations.  Within this point, North Korea and the 
United States agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty, and to take steps to 
normalize relations.  North Korea and Japan agreed to take steps to normalize 
their relationship as well.   
The third point addressed the cooperation to promote energy, trade and 
investment either in a bilateral or multilateral environment.  Within this point, all 
party members agreed to assist North Korea with meeting its energy needs.  The 
last three points were aimed at improving regional stability, advancing the talks in 
a productive manner, and agreeing to meet again in November 2005.79
While the Six-Party Talks addressed six points, the ones that stood out 
involved North Korea’s agreeing to stop its nuclear program and to return to the 
NPT, and the statement of intention to provide light-water reactors to North Korea 
at a time to be determined in the future.  The latter statement jumped to the 
forefront, when North Korea made an announcement the following day.  In less 
than twenty-four hours, North Korea announced it would not abandon its nuclear 
program unless it received light-water reactors first.  This comment not only drew 
attention and criticism within the United States, but also from the other party 
members.  Tension about this provision remained high through the next round of 
talks that were held in November.80   
B. IMPACT WITH SIX-PARTY PARTICIPANTS  
As speculated, the talks in November 2005 were not as productive as the 
previous meeting.  The only items that resulted from the talks was that another 
full meeting would be scheduled for December 2005 or January 2006, and that 
bilateral and working level type meetings should continue until the next full 
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North Korea, but it was not pressed further.  The ROK, Japan, and China agreed 
that North Korea should abandon its program before discussing the light-water 
reactor subject.81   
In an attempt to deflect potential attention from the nuclear issue, North 
Korea announced that the financial sanctions imposed by the United States 
would have a negative impact upon resolving the Six-Party Talks agreements.  
These sanctions were applied to accounts North Korea held in a Macao-based 
bank, which were linked with WMD proliferation activity and money laundering.  
The United States had placed sanctions against other North Korean accounts in 
June, which were suspected in WMD proliferation activities.  Another subject of 
diversion occurred when the United States and KEDO made the decision to stop 
all work on the light-water reactors, as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework.  
North Korea stated that this pullout by the United States caused a huge 
economic loss, and believed it was entitled to receive compensation for this loss.  
North Korea has used these two items to prevent any future progress of the Six -
Party Talks.  This method of moving forward may not bode well for North Korea, 
as the other party members agree with the United States, that this should be 
solved bilaterally and not as part of the Six-Party Talks.82
Continuing the current path with North Korea has both potential positive 
and negative outcomes.  The positive outcomes may include a denuclearized 
Korean peninsula and regional stability, while the negative outcomes potentially 
include indefinite instability in the region and a potential implosion of North 
Korea.  Reviewing the past events with North Korea, it is not hard to envision the 
potential negative consequences.  North Korea relies heavily on China for its 
support, although the ROK has also provided limited assistance.  It is neither in 
China’s nor the ROK’s interest for the state of North Korea either to continue in 
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isolation or to implode.  Both scenarios will impose an economic strain on each of 
them, as a potential flood of North Koreans would spill over into both countries.  
In addition, other potential pitfalls exist. In similar fashion of raising other 
issues and attempting to include them as part of the six-party agenda, North 
Korea could bring up other issues.  One example could be human rights issues.  
Human rights issues could cause the talks to deadlock and grind to a halt.  As 
North Korea opens up to the international community and global market, so will 
its vulnerabilities to international norms.  In this respect, its reclusive nature has 
protected its authoritarian regime from outside prying eyes.  The potential for this 
issue to rise to the top of the agenda is real, because China is known for its past 
human rights abuses.  China, as the most powerful influence on North Korea, 
would also be inviting such scrutiny upon itself as these talks successfully make 
progress. 
C. HARD-LINE STANCE 
The slow progression may be another example of something that would 
cause the Six-Party Talks not to reach its goal.  North Korea may draw attention 
to the similarity of the current progression of talks, with the 1994 Agreed 
Framework.  If the party members bought into this argument, this situation could 
cause the talks to disintegrate.  At any time, if one of the other party members 
supports any one of the arguments the North Koreans may make, this endeavor 
would surely fail.  Successful cooperation with all countries involved dealing with 
North Korea is the key to success.  
It is a complicated path, and at the same time an optimistic goal, to 
envision a denuclearized Korean peninsula and regional stability.  The United 
States and members in the region were initially heading down that path in 1994 
when the Agreed Framework was established. The Agreed Framework was a 
good deal for North Korea, and had this agreement continued through to the end, 
North Korea would have been able to receive the light-water reactors, heavy fuel 
oil at no cost, diplomatic relations with the United States, lifting of the United 
States economic embargo, and most likely a United States nuclear security 
guarantee.  In return, North Korea would have frozen its nuclear program, would 
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have come into full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement, would have 
provided accurate disposition of the discharged fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor, 
and would have dismantled its nuclear facilities.83  
Through the Six-Party Talks, similar goals for North Korea are available.  It 
remains in the best interest overall if North Korea complies with CVID.  When this 
situation is achieved on the peninsula and it receives the commitments from all 
party members, the region is destined to increase in stability.  As relations and 
trust grow between the countries involved along with the potential programs 
countries have stated they would support pending the outcome of a 
denuclearized peninsula, North Korea could potentially emerge as the biggest 
winner. 
As the region becomes more stable, the potential for greater trade 
increases.  North Korea could be the stimulus for trade to increase, as it would 
be a great source of labor.  If this occurs, the peninsula as a whole would benefit.  
Once North Korea complies with CVID principles of its nuclear program, a 
potential increase in business, technology, and commercial trading will follow.  As 
its neighbor on the peninsula, the ROK would benefit both directly and indirectly 
from the increased trade.  All the other members in the region would also 
indirectly benefit from this activity. 
The potential for peace and stability in the region remains an attainable 
goal as long as the party members continue to have a dialogue.  This aspect will 
remain the key ingredient as the United States continues with this policy with 
North Korea.  The difference in the current situation, when compared with the 
past, is the Six-Party Talks’ September 2005 joint statement.  As the Six-Party 
Talks continue to meet and make progress, however small, it will be up to all the 
members to remain focused on the goal.  North Korea will probably continue to 
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diffused the tension during the 1994 crisis on the peninsula, and communication 
will be the key to accomplishing the goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula, 
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V. A FLEXIBLE U.S. POLICY 
Since the United States has a presence in the Northeast Asia region, it 
now has a responsibility to assist in regional stability.  North Korea continues to 
be the focus related to any talks that attempt to increase regional stability.  Thus 
far, usual forms of diplomacy, containment, and deterrence have not been able to 
decrease the real and perceived threat from North Korea following the end of 
World War II.  This chapter proposes that the United States’ foreign policy toward 
North Korea should be more flexible.  After providing the background information, 
this chapter will examine three policy options.  These options will provide 
background information for the next chapter that presents the recommended 
option and provides a possible implementation plan, which will identify the major 
players in the U.S. administration and proposed responsibilities. 
A. REUNIFICATION 
Reunification has been a goal for both Korean states, since the nation was 
divided following World War II.  The peninsula was divided into the Soviet 
Union’s and United States’ areas of responsibility, with the understanding the two 
Koreas would be reunited later in time.  This later time has never developed.  
The situation was further complicated as the south established itself as the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948 followed by the north establishing itself as the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) later in the same year.84
North Korea attempted to reunify the peninsula by force in 1950, starting 
the Korean War.  North Korea understood that reunification of the peninsula was 
its right, and was willing to use military force if necessary to achieve this goal.  
This goal is reflected in North Korea’s updated 1998 constitution, however, the 
wording is more peaceful. “The great leader Comrade Kim Il-sung is the sun of 
the nation and the lodestar of the reunification of the fatherland. Comrade Kim Il-
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sung set the reunification of the country as the nation's supreme task, and 
devoted all his work and endeavors entirely to its realization.“85   
South Korea was not prepared for such an attack, because it lacked the 
industrial base that was in the north.  North Korea initially believed that the attack 
would cause the ROK government to collapse, allowing North Korea to defend its 
ROK brothers from the U.S. invaders.  When the United States intervened with 
the United Nations, the war that was intended by the north to reunite the nation 
turned into an international quagmire.  The military fighting ended when the 
armistice was signed in 1953.  This event may have been interpreted by North 
Korea as an obstacle for reunification.  Through deals and relations with the 
Soviets and Chinese, North Korea continued to attempt to unify the peninsula. 
North Korea had an agreement from the Soviet Union, that the Soviets 
would come to North Korea’s aid if it were invaded by the United States.  Kim Il-
sung made this agreement with Joseph Stalin during one of his visits.  This 
agreement may have emboldened the north.  There have been many attempted 
infiltrations through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from the north as well as minor 
skirmishes at sea.  Two events almost restarted the Korean War.  The first 
incident began as an assassination attempt on the ROK president, and then 
involved a U.S. military vessel.  The second incident involved a skirmish at the 
DMZ.  The commonality among these events is that they both involved U.S. 
military personnel.86
In the first incident, North Korea sent a group of commandos to Seoul to 
assassinate the ROK president in 1968.  This attempt failed and all the 
commandos were killed.  In an attempt not to have attention focused on North 
Korea for the failed attack on the ROK president, North Korea attacked and 
captured the USS Pueblo.  The vessel was in international waters when it was 
attacked, and one person was killed.  This action intensified the political situation, 
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especially when North Korea did not return the remaining crew to the United 
States.  Eventually the crew was returned, but North Korea kept the vessel.87   
The second incident, in 1976, involved a US/ROK joint operation in the 
DMZ.  The soldiers entered the DMZ to trim a few trees.  North Korean soldiers 
attacked this group of soldiers as they were trimming the trees.  During the 
skirmish, fatalities occurred on the U.S. side.  This second event almost drew the 
major powers into another shooting war, since North Korea stated it was just 
another ploy by the United States to improve the upcoming election for President 
Ford.88
The next major friction-causing event occurred later in the 1990s.  It was 
now evident to North Korea that it would need something more than its 
conventional military to both reunify the peninsula and keep its own interests 
alive.  The solution involved having a nuclear capability.  The North Koreans 
were aware of this fact as the cold war began to develop.  The DPRK saw that 
the only way to be one of the major players was to acquire a nuclear capability 
just like the Soviets and Chinese had done.  After the Chinese had achieved a 
nuclear capability, North Korea began to show signs of interest and asked for 
assistance.  When the Chinese would not provide assistance, North Korea turned 
to the Soviet Union for assistance.  The Soviet Union provided nuclear 
assistance on the condition North Korea first enter into the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).   
After North Korea entered the NPT in 1985, it began to exploit the treaty.  
The first example was seen with inspection delays.  Usually, it takes eighteen 
months for a new signatory to complete the process establishing the baseline of 
nuclear facilities and to begin inspections with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).  North Korea was able to delay the treaty process for seven 
years.  By the time the inspections began in 1992, North Korea had run its 
nuclear reactor long enough to change fuel.  Changing the fuel would enable 
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North Korea to be one step closer to acquiring a nuclear capability.  The next  
step in the nuclear fuel cycle process and weapons development process is 
reprocessing the spent fuel rods, the process of extracting plutonium from these 
rods.89
The IAEA inspectors arrived in North Korea and began inspecting the 
nuclear identified facilities.  As the inspections progressed, the IAEA inspectors 
discovered a potential undeclared facility.  When the IAEA inspectors brought 
this to the attention of North Korea officials, the inspectors were told it was just a 
storage facility.  The inspectors requested to inspect the facility to verify the 
claim, but were not allowed to do so.  This action by the North Koreans 
immediately raised concerns with the inspectors.  This incident was reported up 
the chain and caught the attention of the United States.90   
The incident raised international concern when the inspectors were 
expelled from North Korea.  Tensions were high, and the United States was 
contemplating a surgical strike on the nuclear facilities. Former President Carter 
assisted the Clinton administration, by engaging North Korea in dialogue.  North 
Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT, however decided to remain on the 
last day of the notification period.  An agreement was reached, known as the 
Agreed Framework in 1994.91
This agreement stipulated that North Korea would freeze its nuclear 
program in return for concessions.  These concessions included two light water 
nuclear reactors, which would be provided to North Korea from the United States.  
These reactors would replace the current graphite moderated reactor that North 
Korea had used to acquire a source of plutonium for a nuclear weapons program.  
Until the light water reactors were complete and online, North Korea would 
receive heavy fuel oil.  North Korea would use the heavy fuel oil to replace the 
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energy generated from its now frozen nuclear program.  All of the equipment and 
fuel shipments would come through KEDO, a company headed by the ROK that 
had the support of both the United States and Japan.92
The Bush administration, unknown by North Korea at the time, was willing 
to proceed with a bold move in 2002 that included offering economic aid and 
political incentives that would improve North Korean lives.  As part of the Agreed 
Framework, North Korea was supposed to work with the United States, South 
Korea, and Japan to begin the process of dismantling its nuclear program.  
Negotiations continued in that path, although progress was extremely slow.  
During one of the negotiations, a North Korean official told a member of the U.S. 
negotiating party that North Korea was pursuing a secret uranium enrichment 
program.  The exact details of this exchange between the two parties remain a 
debating point.  The United States official, James Kelly, provided evidence to 
North Korea, showing that the United States knew it had a uranium enrichment 
program.  The North Korean delegation then agreed and announced it was 
enriching uranium.  The North Korean delegation team denied the allegation later 
and has never admitted to having such a program.  93
After hearing the news of the uranium enrichment program, not only was 
this bold approach of offering aid and incentives not further implemented, the 
heavy fuel oil shipments were halted.  This action of halting the fuel shipments 
was enough for North Korea to announce its withdrawal from the NPT.  When a 
signatory announces its withdrawal from this treaty, the signatory must wait 90 
days before the action is official.  Other signatories of the treaty must also 
recognize the action.  Since North Korea had withdrawn from the treaty 
previously for 89 days, it announced that it officially had withdrawn from the 
treaty the next day.  Prior to this announcement, North Korea expelled the IAEA 
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inspectors again.  North Korea broke the IAEA seals that marked the frozen 
status of the nuclear program and restarted its heavy water nuclear reactor.94
This action by North Korea again raised tensions in the region, and 
another agreement was reached.  This agreement became what is now known 
as the Six-Party Talks, which involves North Korea, China, Russia, ROK, Japan, 
and the United States.  In fashion similar to previous negotiations that involved 
North Korea, the talks began with delays.  Soon after the talks began, North 
Korea made an official announcement in February 2005 that it had a nuclear 
deterrent capability.  In September of the same year, the first real talks began in 
China.  By the end of the talks, the participants had reached an agreement.  The 
joint statement from this meeting announced that North Korea would give up its 
nuclear program.  The next day, North Korea countered the joint statement by 
announcing that it would only give up its nuclear program after receiving the light 
water nuclear reactors that were part of the earlier 1994 Agreed Framework.95
Another meeting was held in November.  There were no major steps of 
progress announced at the end, only that the talks would continue.  The next set 
of working level talks scheduled for December were canceled by North Korea, 
because the United States froze North Korean assets in a Macao-based bank.  
North Korea wants to settle this issue before continuing with talks.  So far, North 
Korea remains interested in the Six-Party Talks, and the next round was 
scheduled for January 2006.96
As of the time of this writing, North Korea is no longer interested in 
returning to the Six-Party Talks and the financial sanctions have no effect.  A 
North Korean official stated it is cooperating economically with China and Russia, 
and that additional sanctions would not cause any change.97
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In late November 2005, the members of KEDO met to discuss the 
deliverables of the 1994 Agreed Framework.  The discussion focused on the 
provision of providing North Korea with light water nuclear reactors.  As a group, 
KEDO made the decision to no longer pursue the light water reactors.  This 
decision means that the agreement to provide light water nuclear reactors to 
North Korea has been officially taken off the table.98
In reviewing this short history of North Korea’s journey to acquire nuclear 
weapons, it is clear that the U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea has not been 
effective in preventing North Korea from its endeavor of acquiring a nuclear 
weapons capability.  Taking into account that containment, deterrence, and 
current diplomacy have not been able to resolve this regional situation, this 
chapter proposes to examine three flexible foreign policy options the United 
States should pursue.  These three options will be briefly described and one will 
be recommended.  The following chapter will then outline the how the 
recommended foreign policy option could be implemented. 
The first policy option would have the United States to pursue bilateral 
agreements with North Korea.  The United States would seek agreements that 
may or may not involve the status of North Korea’s nuclear program.  A second 
policy option focuses on the process of actively supporting reunification of the 
Korean nation.  This option would actively address the process of bringing the 
two states together, and may or may not address the nuclear knowledge that the 
reunified Korea would possess.  A third policy option seeks to use the Six-Party 
Talks as a roadmap toward stability in the region, while focusing on North 
Korea’s nuclear program.  This policy option would allow the countries involved in 
these talks to pursue other issues, and would involve a long diplomatic process. 
B. BILATERAL AGREEMENT 
The option of seeking bilateral relations with North Korea has been 
recommended to the United States by the ROK many times.  The ROK has 
developed a policy with North Korea over the years.  Under the previous ROK 
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administration under President Kim Dae Jung, it was known as the Sunshine 
Policy.  This policy has continued under the current Roh Moo Hyun 
administration.  Within the United States, some politicians view the Sunshine 
Policy as an appeasement policy, because reciprocity by North Korea is not 
required.  The Sunshine Policy developed in the Kim administration, seeks to 
provide limited assistance as a means of keeping engaged with North Korea.  
The United States views any assistance to North Korea without reciprocity, as an 
action of appeasement.   
The United States does not believe that appeasement, as part of its 
foreign policy is a prudent way to solve issues with North Korea.  The United 
States believes that in reciprocity, nothing is free.  The current Bush 
administration has officially stated that it will not enter into bilateral negotiations 
with North Korea until North Korea has completely, verifiably, irreversibly, 
dismantled (CVID) its nuclear program.  The United States will engage North 
Korea with other countries and nations in the region, but will not engage North 
Korea on its own.  This hard-line position has softened, as illustrated in the latest 
rounds of the Six-Party Talks.  The United States has unofficially met with North 
Korea separately during the talks.99
Establishing bilateral relations with North Korea as well as improving 
bilateral relations with the other party members clearly has more positive than 
negative outcomes.  The goal of this approach would be to establish what is 
known as multi-bilateralism or bi-multilateralism.  These terms mean that each 
state would establish a bilateral tie with each state in the region.  As all members 
improve bilateral relations with each other, negotiations should progress in a 
positive fashion.100     
C. REUNIFICATION 
The option of actively seeking reunification for the Koreas seems to be the 
natural route to take.  The nuclear issue is one item that continues to come up for 
debate.  Most of the players in the region believe that a reunified peninsula would 
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increase regional stability.  When the topic of Northeast Asia comes up, North 
Korea is usually involved in some part of the discussion.  The discussion then 
involves the nuclear program and the potential that North Korea has an 
operational nuclear capability.  When discussing the possible outcomes of a 
unified peninsula, this nuclear item causes much concern. 
A reunified peninsula without nuclear weapons would be the best outcome 
and a lofty goal for those involved to achieve.  If this were to be the case, then 
Korea could be the stabilizing factor for the region.  To its north, both Russia and 
China possess nuclear weapons.  To its east, Japan is a latent nuclear power.  
Even though it does not possess nuclear weapons, Japan does possess the 
scientific knowledge and facilities to quickly translate its peaceful nuclear fuel 
cycle into a nuclear weapons development process.  A reunified Korea could be 
another virtual nuclear power in the region, when both knowledge and facilities 
are combined. 
A reunified peninsula with nuclear weapons would cause tension and 
friction to continue in the region.  If the peninsula were reunified under this 
condition, the next set of questions seeks to answer with whom Korea will ally.  
Of course, this will depend on the process of reunification.  A reunited Korea will 
most likely side with the country that assists it the most and has the most to offer 
following the reunification process.  The current hope would be that Korea would 
ally with the United States and Japan, instead of China or Russia.  If Korea were 
to ally with China, then the friction would remain between Korea and Japan.  If 
Korea were to ally with the United States and Japan, tensions would remain 
between Korea and China.101   
China has potentially the most to lose, depending how the two Koreas 
reunify.  If the United States is the major player in the process, China will most 
likely have to deal with great pressures in its relationship with Taiwan.  If the 
Koreas reunite, that might strengthen the argument for an independent Taiwan.  
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The potential of continued friction in the region following a reunification under 
these conditions is great.  Another reason China may not want to see a reunified 
Korea would be the potential of U.S. forces to be close to China’s northeast 
border.  This could lead to further diplomatic relational challenges, and could be 
leverage that China could use against the new Korea.102
On the other hand, China has potentially the most to gain from a reunified 
Korea.  If China were to be the major player in reuniting the peninsula, it would 
gain a potential ally to balance against the United States and Japan.  This would 
continue the regional friction and possibly start an arms race.  The thought of a 
unified peninsula with nuclear weapons is not in the best interest of either Japan 
or the United States.  Japan would probably develop a nuclear capability, if this 
situation were to come to fruition.  Japan has nuclear facilities that could support 
a nuclear weapons program.  Japan already has limited relations with China and 
Russia, and this would potentially make the situation worse.103
D.  SIX-PARTY TALKS AS A ROADMAP 
The option of using the Six-Party Talks as a roadmap for ensuring stability 
in the region would utilize a combination of methods.  The major points of this 
policy option would include some ingredients of the other policy options, such as 
increasing bilateral relations and supporting reunification of the Korean 
peninsula.  Another major point this option would include involves the NPT.  The 
current focus of the Six-Party Talks deals with the North Korean nuclear issue, 
which could then address its nuclear program as rejoining the NPT.  A last point 
of this policy would include the only success of the current talks, the potential to 
continue a dialogue between the party members.  In this case, no one method 
addresses the path toward stability on the Korean peninsula.104
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Working toward a nuclear free Korean peninsula is only one step removed 
from potentially having a nuclear free reunified Korean nation.  So far, the base 
agreements are in place to begin both endeavors.  Using the Six-Party Talks as 
part of this roadmap increases the probability of it coming to fruition.  As the 
discussions continue, the members could draw from the lessons learned from 
Japan.  Japan would be the model of a nation that is a virtual nuclear power, but 
still remains a nuclear weapon-free country.  Under these conditions, this goal of 
attaining a nuclear weapon-free peninsula could be reached. 
A goal of the Six-Party Talks that deals with the reunification of the 
peninsula would have more of a chance of success than having each country or 
nation in the region work it out.  If only individual nations were involved with this 
endeavor, the process could hopelessly become deadlocked.  The best example 
of this would be North Korea’s past, where it has been able to play the countries 
within the region against each other.  As leverage to receive military assistance, 
North Korea would mention to the Soviet Union that its military support did not 
match support the ROK was receiving from the United States.  North Korea’s 
brinkmanship has protected its regime from having to accept offerings from other 
nations that did not best serve its best interests. 
The NPT continues to be a point of discussion when dealing with North 
Korea.  Its withdrawal from the treaty has sparked controversy and discussion 
that impact areas immediately outside of the region.  Engaging North Korea and 
having it rejoin the treaty is in the best interest of both North Korea and members 
in the region.  The positive aspects would include the potential for North Korea to 
receive assistance to meet its energy needs, while engaging in legal activities.   
Continuing the dialogue in the region is paramount, because 
communication is the key to regional stability.  As long as the nations in the 
region are communicating, the ability to address friction is enhanced.  The 
challenge occurs when the members in the region halt communications.  A 
situation of silence between the regional members will never lead to a positive 
outcome.  The frictions and distrust of one another only grow and have a higher 
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probability of leading to armed conflict.  Signaling through actions is more 
dangerous than even through indirect communication.  The action of one 
member could send the wrong signal to another member, which could lead to an 
armed conflict in the region.   
E. U.S. ROLE IN NORTHEAST ASIA 
The region is best served if the United States pursues a flexible policy with 
North Korea.  The hard-line stance the United States held with the former Soviet 
Union worked during the Cold War, but it has proven ineffective with North Korea 
in the Post-Cold War era.  North Korea’s brinkmanship has served it well from 
the time North Korea became a sovereign state.  Through past negotiations, the 
U.S. policy stance has remained rigid.  It is now time to soften the approach and 
try a different approach. 
Just because the carrots and sticks approach has worked in the past, 
does not mean it will work in the same manner for all situations.  The time has 
come for the United States to review why the carrots are not enticing and the 
sticks not halting unwanted behavior.  For this method to work, the carrots must 
be something North Korea would like to have, while the sticks are actions taken 
against it that it would not like.  Past policies have not been effective carrots and 
sticks, from the viewpoint of North Korea.  For this approach to be effective North 
Korea and United States must have the same understanding of what the carrots 
and sticks mean.  A flexible foreign policy with North Korea has a much better 
chance of success, because it is able to leverage all the states in the region.  By 
doing this, the method takes on an international carrot and stick approach.  As all 
of the states agree on the party line, the carrots become enticing while the sticks 
prevent unwanted behavior.   
The flexible approach will take time, but it is a much better way than 
containment, deterrence, or a military solution.  If conflict occurs on the 
peninsula, the destruction and loss of human life could be devastating.  Both 
North and South Korea gain nothing if damage inflicted sets both of them back 
into pre-modern circumstances. Once regional stability is in place, the rest of the 
pieces should be easier to put into place. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CURRENT POLICY PROS AND CONS 
The U.S. current foreign policy towards North Korea includes different 
types of strategies, which are predominately heavy with containment and 
preemption, with very little attention on engagement.  This strategy has good 
points, which include clearly stating the CVID requirements and providing 
incentives that keep the agreement on track.  U.S. government officials stated 
earlier that negotiations would continue after North Korea commits to completely 
dismantling its nuclear weapons program.  The United States and its allies have 
offered economic incentives as well, as part of providing an incentive for 
continued progress and rewarding the North Korean regime for honoring its 
commitment.105
The CVID approach provides a straightforward path toward ending North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  In this approach, the parties involved would 
agree on a plan that leads to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program.  Coming to an agreement on 
such matters has already become problematic.  When an agreement does occur, 
this strategy seems to have little flexibility and not much room for error or 
mistakes. 
Providing economic and energy incentives to keep the process going is 
key.  By presenting North Korea with these types of incentives, the United States 
and its allies are sending the message that this is a sincere effort and that it is a 
priority.  This message must be understood by the North Korean regime for this 
to have a chance of working.  Addressing these points within a negotiation 
dialogue is the most direct way to get the point across.  
This U.S. current foreign policy towards North Korea has a few negative 
points to consider.  What are the consequences if the North Korean regime does 
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not accept the U.S. policy?  The consequences may lead to more coercive action 
or even a preemptive strike.  If North Korea does not meet the requirements 
agreed upon during negotiations, there is no reason for further engagement.  
This seriously limits the United States and its allies to either applying more 
coercive measures or a preemptive strike. 
Conducting a preemptive strike against North Korea is not a good option, 
however, it may be a consideration.  The March 2006 United States National 
Security Strategy addresses preemption as the last option to use against a 
hostile adversary.  The preemptive strike, in this case, would be exercising the 
United States’ inherent right of self-defense.106
A preemptive strike against North Korea’s nuclear weapons infrastructure 
would not guarantee everything gets destroyed, because the United States does 
not know the locations of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons facilities.  The 
facilities involved with the uranium enrichment program have not been identified 
and are believed to be underground.  Another problem is the number of artillery 
pieces and missiles that would need to be destroyed so North Korea would not 
be able to retaliate against the ROK, Japan, or U.S. forces in the vicinity.   
If North Korea were able to retaliate with only conventional munitions 
against Seoul, it would be catastrophic.  North Korea possesses hundreds of 
missiles that can easily reach South Korea’s capital.  This number of missiles is 
in addition to the number of artillery pieces that are in North Korea’s artillery 
range.  Even though the United States and the ROK would defeat North Korea, 
the human damage to the peninsula is estimated to be from 100,000 to more 
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These are some of the main consequences that will arise if the current 
U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea is not successful.  The main point being 
that there is little flexibility if the North Korean leadership decides not to accept 
this hard-line U.S. stance. 
B. FLEXIBLE POLICY PROS AND CONS 
A flexible U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea has good points.  These 
include being able to adjust and address a new situation while not being tied to 
one method to resolve a specific conflict.  This strategy allows the negotiators to 
explore a wide spectrum of possible solutions, and that ability to explore a wide 
variety of methods provides a much greater chance of leading to a successful 
conflict resolution.  The key is to strike a balance between the current U.S. and 
ROK policies toward North Korea.   
The ROK government is viewed as appeasing the North Korean regime.  
This is in stark contrast of the Bush administration, as it believes the North 
Korean regime cannot be trusted. 108   North Korea may not be trustworthy, 
however, maintaining communications and engagement with a more open policy 
is the best way to approach a solution to bring about a nuclear free peninsula. 
Having a this new policy means when the other party does one action, you 
are not limited to one specific counter action, but have multiple actions to choose 
from.  In essence, all options are kept open, leaving leaders to pick the best one 
that fits the current situation.  This point is important when dealing with a country 
that has been labeled a “rogue state” or part of an “axis of evil.”  As previously 
discussed, the North Korean leadership is skilled in brinkmanship, and one way 
for the United States to combat that skill is with flexibility. 
A flexible U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea does not have truly 
negative aspects.  The structure of the negotiations in this new policy approach 
and step by step process move slowly enough to recognize irregularities.  This 
strategy would provide both a confidence building measure and also get North 
Korea to buy into the situation.  If North Korea attempted to take advantage of 
 
108 Victor Cha, 41.  
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the generosity of the international community, which potential exists, its behavior 
could be modified by withholding some of the economic and energy assistance.  
In this way, U.S. policy would continue to use the carrots and sticks approach, 
only with this option the carrots you use today could be used as sticks later on.109  
This will only occur if the flexible policy maintains engaging communications and 
provides an open forum. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Reviewing the three policy options covered in Chapter V, this thesis 
recommends the option that employs the Six-Party Talks as a roadmap toward 
stability in the region.  This policy option provides the most flexibility when 
dealing with North Korea.  While the other two options have their positive points, 
the third option is able to include those positive points as well.  Having all of the 
parties in the region involved in the outcome sends a better signal to those 
involved as well as to the rest of the international community.   
The international community would be best served by having the 
Northeast Asian region come together to solve the regional tension.  If a country 
outside of the region has the power to influence and guide negotiations to a 
predetermined outcome, stability may not be permanent.  Members in the region 
may not maintain a vested interest if they feel they did not provide support.  
Stability would have a higher probability of remaining pervasive in the region if all 
of the regional members play an active role in the process.  If the members 
solved the stability issue among themselves, then stability has a higher 
probability of remaining in place for a longer period of time.  Since both China 
and Japan are major parts of the global economy, this regional stability or 
instability will greatly affect the international community. 
Implementing this foreign policy with North Korea will involve different U.S. 
departments.  These will include the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, 
Defense, and Education to varying degrees.  Each of these departments has the 
ability to bring a specific and special expertise to bear on formulating a 
successful foreign policy toward North Korea.  
109 Cha, 72. 
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The Department of State would obviously take the lead role, since the 
main focus of this policy would be to exercise diplomacy.  This department would 
have three major responsibilities to carry out.  The success or failure of this 
policy option will come down to the Department of State’s ability to establish 
diplomatic relations with North Korea, establish a reunification working group, 
and coordinate as well as influence U.S. non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that conduct operations within North Korean territory.110
Establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea should be one of the 
first priorities of this policy.  Diplomatic relations open a conduit of communication 
and should not be perceived as something only established between states that 
get along with each other.  Diplomatic relations should be also established with 
states that do not get along well with each other.  Having a dialogue with states 
with which you do not get along is still a dialogue.  Having a dialogue is much 
better than not having a dialogue, which is an extremely dangerous situation.  
The usual way to establish diplomatic relations can be as simple as establishing 
a liaison office to deal with the state.   
Both the United States and North Korea have shown signs that each is 
acceptable to the idea of establishing this relationship.  North Korea has 
repeatedly asked to begin this relationship with the United States.  The topic 
recently came up during the November 2005 talks, that the United States might 
be willing to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea.  Not only does North 
Korea want this, but also the ROK has suggested that the United States establish 
diplomatic ties with South Korea’s northern neighbor.  This action would improve 
future negotiations.  Those items that did not need the attention of the Six-Party 
Talks could be taken up in a bilateral forum. 
When the Department of State establishes a separate reunification 
working group for the Korean peninsula, it would be sending a signal to North 
Korea.  This signal would demonstrate that the United States views the 
reunification issue as a high priority.  By establishing such a group within the 
 
110 Department of State is the lead agency for all diplomatic relations with other states.   
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State Department, it would be able to leverage work already accomplished and 
focus with other State groups that are similarly focused.  By working with other 
reunification groups, such as in the ROK and potentially China and Japan, the 
challenges would be more easily overcome.  When these different reunification 
working groups from the member states work together toward a common goal, 
several alternatives will be generated.  The ideas and proposals for reunification 
would not be limited to one set of cultural norms, but seen and then evaluated 
through a multicultural approach.   
The most difficult endeavor for the State Department to accomplish would 
be to coordinate and have influence over all of the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that enter in and deal with North Korea.  An NGO usually 
will enter a foreign country either when asked by its citizens or invited by its 
government.  Since the situation with North Korea is extremely fragile, this thesis 
proposes a more stringent approach.  For this option to be successful, the United 
States will need to have positive control over all U.S. entities that enter North 
Korea.  In this sense, the State Department will be the one-stop-shop for any and 
all services that are provided by the United States. 
Coordination and influence are vital in this endeavor.  The State 
Department would need to be able to have the power and ability to remove an 
NGO from North Korea, in order for this to be a successful option if something 
were to go wrong.  As the State Department has the lead role for this policy 
option, it would also need to coordinate the operations of the Energy, Commerce, 
Defense, and Education Departments as well. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) would have two primary responsibilities.  
These would only occur after successfully establishing diplomatic relations with 
North Korea.  The DOE would provide its expertise in all energy endeavors North 
Korea would be involved with.  An example where the DOE might assist North 
Korea would be to help determine North Korea’s energy requirements and the 
means to meet those requirements with its current available technology.  This  
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type of assistance would be key to North Korea, since the energy means would 
focus on non-nuclear methods.  As an international endeavor, DOE could partner 
with South Korea or Japan to provide energy assistance.111  
North Korea has a developed scientific base from which to start.  This fact 
is evident in the fact that it has declared it developed a nuclear weapons 
program.  Its scientific expertise could be employed to improve on conventional 
electrical power generation as well as alternative means, such as solar or wind.  
These endeavors would have a positive impact on the state. 
Conventional electrical power generation includes fossil fuel and natural 
gas plants.  These plants would generate energy in the same way as they 
produce energy in the United States.  Another way the DOE could assist would 
be as a member of a multi-state energy project.  When the DOE and other states 
combine their technology and resources for a multi-state energy project, North 
Korea would have its scientific base increased more than if it developed such 
means indigenously.  By applying technology available today to these 
applications, the plants would run much more efficiently than if North Korea had 
moved forward on these projects themselves.  A similar statement could be said 
with alternative means of power generation. 
Alternative means of power generation would include such projects that 
would harness the energy from either the sun or wind.  Wind farms may have the 
advantage in the more mountainous regions, because of the low population.  
Solar technology may prove advantageous to small and remote villages.  This 
would provide an energy source without having to rely on a large support 
infrastructure.  These are just examples of the types of assistance the DOE could 
provide.  The DOE could also partner with other states to provide North Korea 
with an efficient, alternative energy source.  This might lead to North Korea 
producing energy sources, as well. 
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The Department of Commerce (DOC) has the mission in the United States 
to develop trade with other nations, so as to increase the domestic industrial 
capacity.  In this endeavor, the DOC could provide incentives for U.S. companies 
to establish trade relations with North Korea.  As relations between North Korean 
and U.S. businesses mature, another measure may include encouraging U.S. 
companies to establish production lines within North Korea.  These measures 
would have a positive impact on both the United States and North Korea, and 
also the region.112   
Increasing trade and having companies operate in North Korea is not a 
new idea.  The ROK has begun a joint venture with North Korea just north of the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the town of Kaesong.  A joint industrial park broke 
ground in 2003, in preparation for the first 15 ROK companies to operate during 
the pilot phase, with the working force being from North Korea.  The goal is to 
greatly expand this industrial complex in both 2006 and 2007, with the industrial 
park operating with around 250 companies113.  This endeavor will generate 
stability, as the north will begin to be included in the global economy.  This joint 
venture has more promise than an earlier venture conducted between Russia 
and North Korea.  The joint venture, The Tumen Program, between China, 
Russia, and North Korea, with United Nations backing, was just south of the 
Russian border.  This endeavor was based on sea trade, involving Russia, China 
and North Korea.  The venture is still in place, but did not amount to much.114
The Department of Defense (DoD) has three critical roles to play in this 
foreign policy option.  These options include maintaining a credible regional 
presence, continue existing or establish joint operations with the states, and 
validate or disprove the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intelligence.  The  
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first two roles are nothing new to the DoD, while the third role would be a new 
undertaking.  Validation of U.S. intelligence would be conducted by indirect 
means. 
It is important for the United States to maintain its credible presence in the 
region during all aspects of this foreign policy option.  It would be clear that the 
actions of the military would be directed by the State Department, as the policy 
matures.  This is nothing new, since this is how the military is managed on the 
peninsula in the current situation.  Troop movements of each state directly 
influence regional stability.  When troop movements occur sporadically, the 
action may send an unintended signal to the other state.  This unintended signal 
may cause the beginning of a chain of events that could lead to armed conflict.  
While the diplomatic means are underway, troop movements should not be in 
motion. 
The U.S. military carries on annual exercises with some states in the 
region.  As part of this policy option, the U.S. military should engage in and 
conduct limited military exercises with all of the states in the region.  By 
beginning this interaction, both militaries would gain experience that could prove 
useful in the future.  Joint operations should begin small and work up to a size 
and frequency agreeable to both parties.  Conducting these exercises in the 
region will be another positive step as states form bilateral ties. 
By keeping the military presence in a status quo situation, it can be taken 
out of the negotiations.  The current presence of U.S. troops does not constitute 
a threat in the region, although North Korea sees the actions taken by these 
troops as a potential threat to its existence.  This fact is addressed each time the 
United States conducts a large independent military exercise on the peninsula, or 
when the United States conducts joint exercises with both the Japanese and 
ROK militaries.  North Korea announces that the actions are a prelude to 
invasion, which has negatively impacted its economy.  Instead of working at their 
job, North Korea says it must halt its businesses to make preparations for 
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repelling the impending invasion.115  As the region becomes more secure, the  
need for the current number of troops in the region may be reduced.  This would 
be the proper and prudent time to negotiate about U.S. troop strength and a 
potential drawdown in the region.  
The Department of Education would have both a direct and an indirect role 
in the region within this policy option.  Educators can provide their expertise to 
North Korea, providing an alternative western education model.  Increasing 
regional awareness in the United States would be another responsibility.  As 
important it is to have credible force projection in the region, it is just as important 
to have support for such a force projection within the home front.116   
Eastern and western cultures are different, and so are the learning 
methods.  Most states in the region emphasize learning in the early years.  This 
emphasis is quite different when compared to the west.  This emphasis of early 
learning continues into high school, which leads to fierce competition among 
students for the limited slots available to attend prestigious colleges or 
universities.  In the west, the emphasis in education is not felt until much later, as 
students reach high school.   
As part of providing support for the region indirectly, the U.S. domestic 
education structure should emphasize educating students about the Northeast 
Asia region.  Just as students learn about the history and relationships of 
European states, education should equally emphasize the history and 
relationships of the states in Northeast Asia.  As the U.S. public understands the 
situation, the public should be more supportive of the foreign policy that improves 
regional stability. 
This flexible U.S. policy has the potential to be implemented as soon as 
the Six-Party Talks resume.  As soon as the agenda is set, the United States 
would be able to begin implementing this policy.  The implementation would take 
time, and should focus on long term goals.  One model for dismantling the North 
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Korean nuclear weapons program in three phases was developed by the United 
States Institute for Peace.  This model shows how the Six-Party Talks can be 
used as a roadmap to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program.117
The first phase addresses the need for North Korea to freeze its program.  
North Korea would need to declare all of its facilities, equipment and components 
involved with the nuclear weapons program.  The next part of this would be the 
disabling of all the items declared, and finally verification that these actions have 
been completed.118   
The second phase would fully implement the CVID in the current U.S. 
policy.  This phase would also address removing all key nuclear items.  This 
would include but not be limited to plutonium production related equipment, 
uranium enrichment related equipment, and other materials related to either 
plutonium or uranium-based nuclear weapons production.119
The third phase would address North Korea returning to the NPT and 
adhering to international monitoring of any residual or nuclear related technology 
by the IAEA.  This would include but not be limited to medical radiological isotope 
production or procurement, any nuclear power reactors, and former nuclear 
weapons program technology that has transitioned to other uses.  This phase 
would last indefinitely.120
These phases would progress as the Six-Party Talks proceed.  The 
incentives for North Korea would increase as it progresses toward total 
dismantlement.  Not only would the United States provide incentives, but also the 
other members.  It is important to let North Korea know what is expected and 
also what it can expect when it successfully completes the current phase.  It is 
also important to let North Korea know what incentive or incentives it can expect 
to receive after successfully completing the following phase.  By proceeding in 
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this manner, this strategy leverages confidence building measures (CBMs).  A 
CBM is used to lessen tension before, during or after a conflict.121
The United States will greatly improve regional security and stability in 
Northeast Asia when it follows a flexible foreign policy towards North Korea.  The 
first steps will be small, but the end goal of a stable and secure region will be a 
huge success.  By using the Six-Party Talks as a roadmap, the United States 
and its allies will be able to finally accomplish the goal of attaining a nuclear-free 
Korean peninsula.  Using the economic and energy incentives to keep North 
Korea engaged with taking positive steps toward that goal will be possible.  The 
key to this successful endeavor will rely on open and clear communication.  
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